ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Hidden beneath judicial and scholarly obsession with formal proof structures for individual disparate treatment cases is a simpler, more direct method of establishing discrimination. Like earlier efforts, however, this "comparator" approach threatens to fall victim to the conventional wisdom about analyzing discrimination cases, the hostility of the courts to discrimination claims generally, and a fundamentally flawed approach of the plaintiffs' bar to litigating these cases. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to identify the growing reality of comparator proof, put to one side the substantial jurisprudence and scholarship about competing proof struc- tures, and propose a way to neutralize judicial hostility by expanding the kind of proof deployed. The reality on the ground is that discrimination cases today increasingly turn not on whether the plaintiff has proven her prima facie case or established that the "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" is a pretext for discrimination (although the courts continue to invoke the McDonnell Douglas mantra), but rather on whether the plaintiff has identified a suitable "comparator" who was treated more favorably than she. If the comparator is sufficiently similar, that evidence alone is sufficient to permit-but not require-a jury to infer discrimination from the different treatment. Even a somewhat less perfect comparator may, together with other evidence, allow for such an inference.
The term comparator is not my invention, but rather is being increasingly used by courts to describe someone whose treatment by the employer may be an adequate basis for inferring discrimination against the plaintiff. 1 But the courts also use a wide variety of other terms to express essentially the same concept. Sometimes, for example, they speak of identifying others who are "similarly situated" to the plaintiff. 2 In the context of challenges alleging failures to promote, the issue is often framed as whether the plaintiff is "better qualified" than her successful competitor. 3 Where a discharge is concerned, courts often look to whether the plaintiff was replaced by someone of a different race or sex, 4 and even where the termi- 2007) (union found to have discriminated on the basis of gender in providing more aggressive representation of two men than it did of two women when the men were "similarly situated in all material respects").
3. E.g., Mathis v. Wachovia Bank, 255 F. App'x 425, 430 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Mathis has not shown that she was qualified for the FSR position or that she was equally qualified or more qualified than Piper for the FCM position."); Amie v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 253 F. App'x 447, 453 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing "relative qualifications" of plaintiff and his successful competitor); Brown v. Ill. Dep't of Natural Res., 499 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff not more qualified than successful competitor); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 162 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that the success of a disparate treatment claim for failure to promote "depends on evaluation of the comparative qualifications of the applicants for promotion to field inspector and on analysis of the credibility of the reasons for the promotion decisions provided by those who made the decisions").
4.
See, e.g., Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that, as which should have propelled the issue to center stage. At issue in Ash was a particularly egregious effort by one circuit to limit comparator proof. The Eleventh Circuit had, apparently in all seriousness, held that a plaintiff can use her asserted superior qualifications relative to those of a comparator to prove discrimination only when "'the disparity in qualifications is so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.'"
10
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Ash rejected the Eleventh Circuit's grudging approach to comparative evidence, 11 but it did so grudgingly.
part of her prima facie case, plaintiff must establish that "she was replaced by a male (or that males with similar qualifications were retained)"); see also infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
5.
See, e.g., Webb v. Level Cir. 1993) . As articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Ash, the "slap in the face rule" applied to whether the defendant's claim that it had promoted a better qualified white was a pretext for discrimination. See Ash, 129 F. App'x at 533. We will see that comparative qualifications can also arise in connection with whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case. See infra note 70.
11. The Court in Ash also held that the Eleventh Circuit had committed error in apparently refusing to give weight to evidence showing that the supervisor in question had referred to each of the plaintiffs as "boy." The Court of Appeals had held that, " [w] hile the use of 'boy' when modified by a racial classification like 'black' or 'white' is evidence of discriminatory intent, the use of 'boy' alone The two plaintiffs in Ash had won a jury verdict below, but the trial judge had nonetheless granted judgment as a matter of law against them; the Eleventh Circuit had affirmed as to one plaintiff, Ash, on the ground that he had not adduced sufficient evidence to show pretext because the court was not slapped in the face by his arguably superior qualifications. The Supreme Court reversed, stressing that its prior decisions had stated that "qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext." 12 It cited to one case where the Court had said that a plaintiff's proof that he was better qualified than his successful competitor could prove pretext 13 and another where the Court had said that the plaintiff's proof that the employer "'misjudged the qualifications of the applicants . . . may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination.'" 14 Not surprisingly, the Court then wrote that " [t] he visual image of words jumping off the page to slap you (presumably a court) in the face is unhelpful and imprecise as an elaboration of the standard for inferring pretext from superior qualifications." 15 Although "slap in the face" was too restrictive, the Court failed to take the opportunity to announce the appropriate standard, noting, " [t] his is not the occasion to define more precisely what standard should govern pretext claims based on superior qualifications. . . . It suffices to say here that some formulation other than the test the Court of Appeals articulated in this case would better ensure that trial courts reach consistent results." 16 In this regard, Ash is a profoundly unsatisfying opinion. On the most obvious level, its approval of comparator evidence in the abstract was counterbalanced by an explicit refusal to announce the appropriate standard, the effect of which was exacerbated by the Court's repeated stress that its holding did not necessarily mean that judgment as a matter of law against Ash should be reversed-"The judgment of the Court of Appeals, and the trial court rulings it affirmed, may be correct in the final analysis." 17 Indeed, it is possible to read the opinion as simply chastising the is not evidence of discrimination." Ash, 129 F. App'x at 533 (citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court disagreed that "the term, standing alone, is always benign. The speaker's meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage. Insofar as the Court of Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in all instances to render the disputed term probative of bias, the court's decision is erroneous." Ash, 546 U.S. at 456.
12.
Id. at 457.
13.
Id. 
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 458.
17.
Id. at 456. At another point, the Court wrote: "Today's decision, furthermore, should not be read to hold that petitioners' evidence necessarily showed pretext. The District Court concluded oth-Alabama Law Review [Vol. 60:2:191 Eleventh Circuit's purple prose in formulating a silly legal standard, a puzzling exercise for a Court with other pressing concerns and a limited docket.
18
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reached the same result as it had before, however this time using a less restrictive test. 19 At a deeper level, Ash is unsatisfying because it delves so superficially into the role of comparator proof in Title VII cases. Ash is the Supreme Court's first encounter with the fundamental problem of proof of discrimination since Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. 20 In Desert Palace, the Court held that "sufficient evidence" that discrimination was "a motivating factor" in an employment decision established a violation, and that "direct evidence" was not necessary in order to prove that discrimination was "a motivating factor." 21 Desert Palace explicitly restricted the entire McDonnell Douglas proof structure, and, in the view of many commentators, eliminated it.
22
Ash is itself perfectly consistent with McDonnell Douglas since the question before the Court was the role of comparator proof in the pretext stage of McDonnell Douglas analysis. But the opinion is unsatisfying not merely because it fails to further define the line between McDonnell Douglas cases and Desert Palace cases, 23 but, more important for present purposes, because it failed to meaningfully confront the role of comparator proof even in a McDonnell Douglas setting. Ash, then, suggests that the Court appreciates the increasing importance of comparator evidence but lacks a coherent theory of how such evidence should be assessed. Under this reading, Ash is both a rebuke to the lower courts' overly restrictive view of comparative evidence and a signal that a more coherent approach needs to be developed.
Nor is Ash alone in this regard. To considerable fanfare, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case that raised a different kind of comparator question. Derogatorily labeled "me too" cases, the issue in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn 24 was the admissibility of evidence of age discrimination against workers who were not under the supervision of the individual who allegedly discriminated against the plaintiff. Expected to illuminate how discrimination cases are litigated under both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII, Mendelsohn ended up re- 
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solving only who should decide the issue rather than giving guidance on how the issue should be resolved. The Court unanimously concluded that, so long as no per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility was applied, the trial court had discretion to admit or deny such evidence.
25
If anything, Mendelsohn provides less guidance than Ash on an issue important to the antidiscrimination project, although both might be read to suggest that courts should stop treating discrimination cases as needing special evidentiary rules rather than treating them as any other kind of fact finding.
In any event, this Article begins the task that the Court has thus far avoided, suggesting a more commonsensical approach to discrimination claims-one that reframes proof in terms of the underlying substantive law rather than focusing on special evidentiary rules or proof structures. It concludes: (1) a simpler, more direct way to approach most discrimination cases is for the plaintiff to identify a comparator(s) who is sufficiently similar that the inference of discrimination may be drawn by a jury merely from the existence of the comparator. No presumption is required by this approach; (2) while comparator proof can be fit into traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis (and the lower courts typically do so), it should be recognized as an alternative method of proof, which is more consistent with the Court's more holistic approach to proving discrimination under Desert Palace; (3) as the Eleventh Circuit's "slap in the face rule" indicates, the lower courts recognize the centrality of comparator proof but have not yet developed the tools to assess it effectively. Left largely to their own devices, judges have looked to their own worldviews to develop a series of rules that limit comparator evidence to individuals who are very close comparators indeed-what I describe as the "almost twin" approach; (4) Mendelsohn opens the way for a less rule-bound approach to comparator proof; but for real change to occur, the courts must be provided with the kind of evidence that will allow a more holistic assessment of whether discrimination is sufficiently likely in given fact scenarios to send a case to the jury; (5) given judge and jury roles, this can be achieved only by a two-fold reform. First, courts must substitute a more objective standard for current judicial worldviews about when an individual is sufficiently similar to the plaintiff to allow the jury to infer discrimination from a difference in treatment. Second, plaintiffs should adduce-and courts should admit-expert testimony about whether other employers would treat the proffered comparators comparably.
25.
See infra text accompanying notes 102-116. Alabama Law Review [Vol. 60:2:191
I. INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT
Ash and Mendelsohn, like the vast majority of discrimination claims in federal court, were individual disparate treatment cases. As the name suggests, a violation under this theory requires an employer to treat an individual differently than it treats (or at least would treat) another person of a different race-or, for that matter, religion, national origin, or the opposite sex. Critically, the difference in treatment must be intentional; that is, the employer must be motivated by the victim's status as, say, an African American.
26
This follows from the fact that Title VII does not lay down any substantive workplace standards; rather, it merely requires equality.
27
All employees are to be treated the same-but only to the extent that treating any employee differently than another employee on a prohibited ground is prohibited. Some would qualify this statement by interpolating the words "similarly situated" between "another" and "employee." But a moment's thought reveals that "similarly situated" is not a requirement of the statute but rather a way of determining whether a difference in treatment is racebased. 28 The notion of "similarly situated" is, of course, central to the thrust of this Article-when comparators are sufficiently alike, differences in treatment are probative of discrimination.
What seems like a simple concept has generated enormous complications. The dominant proof structure takes its name from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 29 although it evolved over a number of Supreme Court decisions. As is well known, McDonnell Douglas lays out a three-step process, with the third step typically being determinative. The plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination.
30
If she succeeds, the employer can avoid liability only by carrying a burden of production of putting into evidence a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the 26 .
See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("'Disparate treatment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.").
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)) ("It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ."); cf. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005) ("'Discrimination' is a term that covers a wide range of intentional unequal treatment; by using such a broad term, Congress gave [Title IX] a broad reach.").
28. A compensation policy that preferred male employees over females violated the law, regardless of whether every male employee was similarly situated to a corresponding female. Finally, if the defendant carries that burden, the plaintiff, in order to prevail, must show that that reason was a pretext, not merely in the sense that it was not the real reason, but also in the sense that the real reason was discrimination. 32 However, proof that the reason is pretextual in the first sense will usually be sufficient to allow, but not require, the further conclusion that it is a pretext for discrimination.
33
McDonnell Douglas is sometimes described as single motive/circumstantial evidence and is contrasted with what are typically called "mixed motives" cases. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 34 introduced an alternative proof structure for such cases. As originally formulated in that decision, a plaintiff who produced "direct evidence" that discriminatory intent was "a substantial factor" in an employment decision 35 shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant to avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision even if the prohibited consideration were absent. Price Waterhouse was in turn modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which added § 703(m) to Title VII. This provision codified (in a considerably altered form) the Price Waterhouse approach.
36
As the
31.
Id. This "requirement" flows from the fact that, should the defendant fail to carry its burden, judgment for the plaintiff must follow from proof of the prima facie case. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) ("Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.").
32.
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (" [A] reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.") (emphases omitted).
33. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000) ("In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as 'affirmative evidence of guilt.' Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision . . . . This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability." (citations omitted) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992))). Notably, there is no requirement of "direct evidence" for such proof, as in Price Waterhouse.
38
Should the jury find a motivating factor, liability follows, although the defendant may nevertheless limit plaintiff's recovery by carrying the burden of persuasion that it would have made the same decision even had the motivating factor not been present. 39 There is considerable scholarly dispute regarding the rationale for the This Article, however, does not enter into that debate. Rather, it isolates an increasingly common kind of proof-comparators-and explores both how comparators are currently viewed by the courts and how such proof can be deployed more effectively.
We have seen that discrimination is at root a difference in treatment.
42
Accordingly, whatever the proof structure, a violation occurs when an demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."). The word "demonstrates" is defined to mean "meets the burdens of production and persuasion." 42 U. 39. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000) (providing that, when "an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m)," an employer who demonstrates that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor," is not liable for damages or subject to "an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment," but may be subject to declaratory or injunctive relief and "attorney's fees and costs").
40. The three competing views are the "process of elimination" justification, Michael J. 
2002)).
The relationship between the Equal Pay Act's statute of limitations and the limitations period under Title VII is more complicated. The EPA has a two-or three-year limitations period (depending on whether the violation is "willful"). 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2006); Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 658, n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As for Title VII, the majority's reading of Title VII in Ledbetter effectively confined the period to 180 or 300 days (depending on whether the violation occurred in a state with a fair employment practices agency) measured from the compensation decision at issue, not from its manifestation in any particular paycheck. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623-25 (majority opinion). On Jan. 29, 2009, however, President Obama signed into law the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, which amends Title VII (and other antidiscrimination laws) to provide that an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice. Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5-6 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)). This amendment, therefore, removes any statute of limitations for violations that affect compensation, although the new law does limit backpay recovery to two years prior to the charge filing. § 3 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B)). It seems clear that the amendment will apply to all claims, even those extinguished by the Ledbetter decision, with the exception of those for which a final judgment has been entered. Once a comparator is identified, the plaintiff would argue that the reason for the more favorable treatment is in fact the prohibited characteristic and might try to adduce proof beyond the mere existence of that person to establish that the employer's motivation for the difference was that characteristic. For example, the plaintiff might introduce admissions of the defendant that the factor in question (race in our example) was viewed negatively by the decision maker. The plaintiff might also adduce other comparators to strengthen the inference of employer discrimination that a particular comparator evoked. In response, the defendant might seek to explain why the supposed comparator was different than plaintiff or to proffer other comparators (either individuals in plaintiff's class who were treated better than plaintiff or other individuals of the different class who were treated worse than the comparator plaintiff proffers). When the dust settles, the question would be whether a trier of fact could (or does) determine that the treatment at issue was discriminatory. This may seem pretty straightforward, but, as my sketch of the McDonnell Douglas-Price Waterhouse-Desert Palace authority indicates, Title VII proof structures have a far more tortuous history, at least in terms of formal analysis. Without trying to plumb all the depths of this history, this Article turns in Part II to an examination of where comparators fit into the present formal conceptions of proof of discrimination. Part III then considers why comparator proof has not played a more explicit role in employment discrimination law, and Part IV examines how the circuit courts actually deal with such proof. Part V then maps out a better way of proving discrimination through comparators.
II. COMPARATORS IN THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DISPENSATION
Despite Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace, the overwhelming majority of individual disparate treatment cases are still litigated under the McDonnell Douglas proof structure, and, despite the term "disparate treatment," the notion of a comparator is still not prominent in the Supreme Court's articulations of that structure. As we have seen, McDonnell Douglas establishes a three-step process: plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case, defendant's putting into evidence a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason," and plaintiff's proof that that reason was a pretext for discrimination.
With respect to the prima facie case, the original McDonnell Douglas formulation was so fact-specific that it has applied to almost no actual cases. 45 As framed, it described only a failure to hire situation, and then only 45 .
To make out a prima facie case of race discrimination, the plaintiff must establish: (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was re- when the position remained vacant rather than, as will almost always be true, being filled by a competitor within a relatively short time. However, the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was soon rationalized by the Court as requiring merely that a minority member or woman was denied an employment opportunity in circumstances where the most obvious innocent explanations, such as plaintiff's lack of qualifications or the absence of an opening, are inapplicable.
46
This naturally led to a focus away from comparators.
McDonnell Douglas, however, had explicitly invited the lower courts to adapt its prima facie case to workplace situations differing from the anomalous failure to hire it addressed. Since the McDonnell Douglas specification of the prima facie case is inapplicable by its terms to discriminatory discharges, some lower courts had required the prima facie case to include proof of replacement by someone outside her protected class. Under the ADEA, that meant that some courts required a plaintiff to show that he was replaced by someone under age forty. A replacement is, of course, one kind of a comparator. The Court, while rejecting this particular rule, affirmed the relevance of comparators: the relevant showing was that the plaintiff had been replaced by someone substantially younger (whether or not below forty). The age discrepancy requirement was explained as providing "a logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for which it establishes a 'legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption. '" 49 Inferring age discrimination when the replacement was substantially younger than the plaintiff is much more significant than whether the person is younger than forty.
It is possible to read O'Connor for its negative implication: that a proper comparator-a replacement-is necessary for a prima facie case of discharge, but the lower courts focused instead on the rule the Court rejected-plaintiffs had to identify a comparator outside the protected class. holding that, while proof of replacement by a person outside plaintiff's class might be sufficient in a discharge case to establish a prima facie case, it was not necessary.
51
Some cases looked to the McDonnell Douglas rationale to reject any requirement of proof of a replacement: since such proof had no relationship to eliminating the most common nondiscriminatory bases for a decision, it was not necessary to a prima facie case.
52
Resistance to requiring proof of a comparator might also have been due to the perception explored below, that identifying appropriate comparators is a very difficult task because workers differ from each other along so many axes. 53 Thus, it will usually be possible to question the appropriateness of any comparator the plaintiff proffers, and there were those who thought this controversy inappropriate, at least for the prima facie case. 54 In any event, the lower courts have pretty clearly rejected comparator proof as necessary. 
50.
Id. at 312.
51.
See [A] plaintiff who can prove that she was replaced by a member of the opposite sex need not show that she possesses qualifications similar to those of her replacement."). See generally Lidge, supra note 8, at 836 n.20 (collecting cases).
52.
See, e.g., Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 353 ("Requiring that a gender-discrimination plaintiff prove she was replaced by a man, as the District Court instructed the jury here, eliminates no common, lawful reasons for the discharge."); see also Lidge, supra note 8, at 855-59.
53.
See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
54.
See, e.g., Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 645 (2000) ("[I]t is very difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are more qualified than the candidate selected by the employer. Employers normally hire and promote on the basis of multiple criteria. As a result, an employer can always point to at least one criterion, which it claims is critical to the position, on which the plaintiff is weaker than the candidate selected."); Lidge, supra note 8, at 859-61.
55. Perhaps the most obvious example is that, to the extent that qualifications are to be judged for the prima facie case, it was "minimum qualifications," not qualifications as compared to other work- o make out a prima facie case, an employee must show that she met the objective or minimum qualifications for the position in question. She is not required to show that she met her employer's subjective standards. It is the employer's burden to raise these subjective standards in response to the plaintiff's prima facie case."). This unanimity, however, conceals the extent to which the lower courts have permitted comparator proof, whether in the prima facie case or at the pretext stage. With respect to the prima facie case, two formulations came to dominate the lower courts' articulations of the requirements of the prima facie case.
56
One is generalized, and the other particularized to the discharge situation. The generalized formulation is strikingly tautological:
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is competent to perform the job or is performing his duties satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the decision or action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on his membership in the protected class.
57
The best that can be said for this "inference-from-circumstances" test 58 is that it provides literally no guidance; the worst that can be said for it is that it is internally inconsistent. After all, if plaintiff can adduce evidence of circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, as the fourth prong requires, it is not so clear what work the other three elements do. 59 Nevertheless, this formulation is common. Prong two, which requires proof of either qualifications (in the hiring situation) or satisfactory performance of the job (in the situation where current workers suffer an adverse employment action) does have significance but generally means merely minimum, objective qualifications, see supra note 55, or satisfactory performance, and therefore does not require probing analysis of employer decision making by comparing plaintiff with other applicants or employees. See, e.g., Pope v. ESA Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1007 (8th Cir. 2005).
60. As of Feb. 7, 2009, a search in LexisNexis's Federal and State Cases combined database revealed that the phrase "under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination" appears in both reported and unreported cases a total of 1,704 times. Nearly half the time-803 instances-these cases also use some version of "compare," usually, but not always, in describing what we have labeled a "comparator."
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What is striking about the cases employing this formulation is how often the "circumstance" in question is some kind of comparator proof, 61 although other bases for inferring discrimination are sometimes used. 62 Indeed, the "circumstances" language may have been chosen precisely to avoid elevating comparators into the prima facie case. Further, if courts using this inference-from-circumstances test do not look to comparators for the prima facie case, they typically look to them at the pretext stage in order to draw the ultimate inference of discrimination. We will see that, at whatever stage the question is considered, the absence of a comparator is often fatal to a claim. 63 The second common formulation of the prima facie case is more tailored to the most common discrimination claim-discharge. 64 The prima facie case of discrimination may be proven by showing: "(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) termination from employment or other adverse employment action; and (4) the ultimate filling of the position with an individual who is not a member of the protected class." 65 This version of the prima facie case is typically framed as an alternative to the "inference-from-circumstances" approach; thus, a plaintiff can make out her prima facie case either way.
66
Viewed by itself, however, this formulation incorporates only the broadest version of comparator-replacement by someone outside the plaintiff's class. There is no requirement that the plaintiff compare herself to anyone in terms of qualifications or performance. 67 Again, however, we will see that the comparator 61 .
See infra note 68. 62.
These include admissions by employers, for example. See, e.g., Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2007).
63.
See infra text accompanying note 72. 64.
In the early days of Title VII, hiring cases were quite common, and the first Supreme See id. ("Alternatively, the fourth prong of the prima facie case may be satisfied if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the discharge or adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of plaintiff's membership in that class.").
67.
A variation on this particularized formulation is applicable to "reductions in force," that is, situations in which the employer is downsizing. In such cases, the justification for laying off the plaintiff is apparent on its face-the employer is laying off a number of workers to cut costs-and there is, by definition, no replacement. Accordingly, the plaintiff is required to show something more than just loss of position while doing satisfactory work, and this is usually framed in terms of proving that 
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The Phoenix from the Ash 207 plays a critical role in the ultimate question of discrimination vel non, and the closer the comparator, the more difficult it will be for the defendant to assert a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and the easier it will be for a plaintiff to prove pretext. In short, neither of the common lower court formulations of the prima facie case explicitly requires evidence of a comparator, although the "inference-from-circumstances" permits it, and the replacement with a nonclass member version requires proof that some person of a different race or the opposite sex was favored.
68
There is a third formulation of the prima facie case, however, which does explicitly require comparators. In disparate discipline cases, the plaintiff usually has admittedly engaged in misconduct but claims he was punished more severely than others who committed the same or a similar infraction.
69
As might be expected, comparators are central to the prima facie case in these situations. Plaintiff must show: "'1) that he belongs to a protected class under Title VII; 2) that he was qualified for the job; and 3) that a similarly situated employee engaged in the same or similar misconduct but did not receive similar discipline.'" 70 We will explore these cases in more detail shortly. 68. In contrast to this statement, Professor Lidge asserts that six circuits require that plaintiffs identify a comparator as part of their prima facie case and that three more circuits have case law going both ways. Lidge, supra note 8, at 849. Some of these cases involve disparate discipline and are treated in Part IV of this Article. See infra text beginning at note 95. Putting these aside, it would be more accurate to say that these circuits permit a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case by virtue of a comparator. Some of the cases Professor Lidge cites do in fact speak of a prima facie case as including the requirement of a similarly situated individual, but it is reasonably clear that the courts are simply using one of a number of alternative formulations of the prima facie case. For example, while he cites several Seventh Circuit cases as requiring a comparator, see Lidge, supra note 8, at 845 n.77 (citing Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir. 2000)), Professor Lidge elsewhere cites authority from that circuit that does not frame the prima facie case in this fashion. See Lidge, supra note 8, at 836 n.20 (citing Leffel v. Valley Fin. Servs., 113 F.3d 787, 794 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Evidence of disparate treatment is certainly one of the most obvious ways to raise an inference of discrimination absent direct proof of discriminatory animus. It should not be understood as the only means of doing so, however. . . . All that is necessary is that there be evidence reasonably suggesting that the employer would not have taken adverse action against the plaintiff had she not been disabled and everything else had remained the same.").
69. Indeed, whether the plaintiff's actions are considered "misconduct" in the workplace may well depend on whether they are tolerated or very lightly sanctioned for other workers.
70 Even putting the disparate discipline cases aside, the absence of a comparator in the other formal articulations of the prima facie case should not obscure the fact that plaintiffs tend to lose when they cannot point to a comparator, either because some courts require such proof for a prima facie case or, more commonly, because the court tends to find comparators critical for pretext proof. 72 In nearly every case in which the plaintiff has lost out to a competitor, 73 the employer will claim that the competitor is different-typically better qualified than the plaintiff-in order to carry its burden of production of a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason." Although "qualifications" can include factors like seniority that do not necessarily have much to do with merit as that term is used in other contexts, the ultimate finding of discrimination will typically turn on whether the person is superior along one of these qualifications axes or, at least, whether the employer was reasonable in so concluding. Indeed, a conclusion by the trier of fact that a comparator could not be reasonably thought to be superior to a plaintiff goes a long way towards finding the defendant to have discriminated.
In light of this, many if not most cases claiming individual disparate treatment can be reframed much more simply than the various proof strucmore favorably than plaintiff was an element of a prima facie case of disparate discipline).
71.
See infra text accompanying notes 95-99. Most cases resolved against plaintiffs before trial find or assume a prima facie case but find no sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to decide that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination. Given this reality, one circuit has viewed the establishment vel non of a prima facie case as "a largely unnecessary sideshow." Brady v.
Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court went on:
Lest there be any lingering uncertainty, we state the rule clearly: In a Title VII disparate-treatment suit where an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not-and should not-decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Rather, in considering an employer's motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in those circumstances, the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin? Id.
72.
See, e.g., Riley v. Emory Univ., 136 F. App'x 264, 266-67 (11th Cir. 2005) (employee lost because no similarly situated employee identified); Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2005) (employee failed to establish a prima facie case because he did not present evidence that white employees were treated any better); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 340 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002) (ADEA plaintiff who did not provide evidence that a similarly situated younger employee was granted the transfer request sought by plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination); Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff could not identify another employee who was similarly situated with respect to her allegedly harsher discipline); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Evans simply has failed to demonstrate that she was more qualified than [the comparator for a promotion] and thus more deserving of the duties.").
73. The most common scenarios will be hiring, promotions, or raises, but even a reduction in force where a member of another group is kept in place of plaintiff can be viewed as a competitive scenario. Nor does it require abandoning the McDonnell Douglas proof structures that avoid comparators. It merely suggests that, in many cases, there is a simpler way of proceeding.
III. OBSTACLES TO MOVING TO COMPARATOR PROOF
It is fair to ask why, if comparator evidence is such an obvious way to prove discrimination, the courts have not been more explicit in focusing on it. To some extent, the answer lies in the history of the proof structures we have explored, particularly the happenstance that McDonnell Douglas articulated its prima facie case in terms of an almost nonexistent fact scenario. 75 Perhaps among other potential benefits, Desert Palace can facilitate a move away from the artificial proof structures that have confined Title VII law. 76 That case, it will be recalled, held that to establish a jury question of a Title VII violation "a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice. '" 77 This formulation may not seem significant to those not steeped in Title VII proof structures: after all, what cause of action does not require "sufficient evidence" of the elements of the claim to get to the jury? But Desert Palace does not merely reject proof of a stronger, determinativefactor version of causation.
78
It also offers the opportunity to take a more commonsensical approach to proof of individual disparate treatment by shifting from McDonnell Douglas proof structures to framing the inquiry in terms of whether plaintiff can identify a favored comparator. Why then, hasn't it happened? One obvious reason for the failure of comparator proof to more explicitly supplement McDonnell Douglas proof structures is the doctrinal argument that such proof is just a riff on the McDonnell Douglas mantrathe comparator functions as the prima facie case, requiring the employer to put forth some reason why the comparator, although similar enough to prima facie suggest discrimination, is in fact different on some basis other than his race. This would leave the plaintiff to show that this difference is pretext.
The doctrinal response is straightforward: the comparator is the proof of pretext. That is, a sufficiently similar comparator should allow the jury 81.
There is a continuing debate about the overall effect of Desert Palace. Although it explicitly eliminated the direct evidence threshold to "motivating factor" analysis in mixed motives cases, it expressly reserved the question of its effect in other contexts. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n. to draw the inference of discrimination-even though the jury might instead credit whatever nonracial explanations the defendant may avow. The degree of similarity, and the plausibility of the supposed differences as bases for decision, can factor into the ultimate determination. A second and more serious objection to moving to comparators as the primary method of proving discrimination is that such proof is subject to the same problems that confront almost all methods of proving individual disparate treatment-the end result is few cases going to juries and even fewer verdicts being rendered or withstanding review. 83 This is true despite a widespread scholarly consensus that discrimination remains prevalent in the American workplace. 84 We have seen that the federal courts 83 .
See , at A1 (citing an unreleased study of 13 seasons of NBA games and 600,000 fouls and concluding both that white referees called fouls at a greater rate against black players than against white players and that there was a corresponding, although lower, bias for black officials and white players). There is speculation that the dramatic disparity between the results of the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary and the pre-election polling, which was on target for the Republican primary, reflected the unwillingness of those polled to admit to voting against an African American, then-Senator Barack Obama. This is in contrast with the 
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The Phoenix from the Ash 213 since the Court passed up the opportunity to make some meaningful change in this area. A focus on comparators has the potential to make the entire discrimination project more sensible, and thus, any significant step in this direction requires a better approach to comparators. The next part undertakes a more detailed review of current circuit court treatment of comparators before the Article turns to sketching a better approach in Part V.
IV. CURRENT CIRCUIT VIEWS OF COMPARATORS
As we have seen, the lower courts have encountered comparators at two stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis: establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and proving pretext when the employer has put into evidence a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. And they have encountered comparators both in what might be called "normal" discrimination cases and in cases charging discriminatory discipline. While the latter are not analytically different from the former, the fact that there is typically a discrete act of misconduct at issue makes the use of comparators who have been guilty of similar misconduct especially compelling, 85 and exploring the current use of comparators should start there.
In its only case involving allegedly disparate discipline, the Supreme Court suggested that only a rough equivalence of offenses was sufficient to draw the inference of discrimination. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 86 three workers were charged with theft of sixty gallons of antifreeze. While all three seemed to be equally guilty, the two whites were discharged while the African American was retained. After holding that whites could sue for race discrimination under both Title VII and § 1981, the Court wrote:
Precise equivalence in culpability between employees is not the ultimate question: as we indicated in McDonnell Douglas, an allegation that other 'employees involved in acts against [the employer] of comparable seriousness . . . were nevertheless retained . . .' is adequate to plead an inferential case that the employer's reliance on his discharged employee's misconduct as grounds for terminating him was merely a pretext. 87 
85.
We have seen that some courts frame the prima facie case in disparate discipline situations this way. which affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. The court not only rejected other evidence tending to show discrimination against older females, but it also found that plaintiff's dismissal for reversing overdraft charges totaling $1,099 for her co-workers was not comparable to three other instances in which workers were given less discipline or not disciplined at all for the similar conduct. While acknowledging that disparate discipline was actionable when plaintiff was similarly situated to a comparator, the court wrote:
"Sometimes apparently irrational differences in treatment between different employees that cannot be explained on the basis of clearly articulated company policies may be explained by the fact that the discipline was administered by different supervisors, or that the events occurred at different times when the company's attitudes toward certain infractions were different, or that the individualized circumstances surrounding the infractions offered some mitigation for the infractions less severely punished, or even that the less severely sanctioned employee may be more valuable to the company for nondiscriminatory reasons than is the other employee. Other times, no rational explanation for the differential treatment . . . may be offered other than the inevitability that human relationships cannot be structured with mathematical precision, and even that explanation does not compel the conclusion that the defendant was acting with a secret, illegal discriminatory motive." 89 It concluded, "Hence, it is up to the plaintiff to establish not only that differential treatment occurred, but also to rule out nondiscriminatory explanations for the differential treatment."
90
This passage is, on one level, unobjectionable-differences in treatment must be race-or sex-premised to be actionable, and plaintiff has the burden of showing the underlying intent. Further, such differences do not compel an inference of discrimination "as a matter of law," if only beto Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination.").
88 cause the jury can credit the defendant's denial of impermissible motivation, no matter how strong the inferential evidence. Finally, random, and even irrational, factors may explain sex-correlated decisions. However, Timmerman is profoundly wrong on two counts. First, it states as a matter of law what would be more appropriately viewed as an argument to the jury. The possibility of nongender explanations does not exclude the possibility of a gender explanation, and juries are, within broad limits, supposed to weigh competing explanations. Second, the strong suggestion is that differences in treatment, even irrational ones, are so common as to not justify an inference of discrimination when the disadvantaged person is a woman, African American, or other minority. Contrary to the court, the plaintiff need not "rule out" nondiscriminatory explanations but need only offer sufficient proof by which a jury could infer discrimination was more likely than such explanations. Indeed, the last sentence in the extract might suggest that differences in treatment are never enough to justify a jury finding discrimination. That is, of course, as incorrect as the notion that the passage seeks to rebut-that differences in treatment necessarily reflect intent to discriminate.
In short, the question is not whether differences in treatment can suffice, it is when they will. Indeed, the passage is a remarkable indictment of American capitalism coming from courts who often celebrate its efficiency: differences in discipline, even irrational ones, are so common that no inferences can be drawn from them-except the obvious that employers very often have no rhyme or reason for what they are doing. Timmerman is, unfortunately, not alone in taking such a hostile approach: the "slap in the face rule" originated from such perceptions.
Whatever objections one might have to the tone of cases such as Timmerman, the rules that the lower courts have developed are even more problematic. Timmerman itself is reminiscent of the now-discredited "pretext-plus" rule, under which proof of pretext was not sufficient to allow a jury to infer discrimination; 91 rather, the plaintiff was also required to show additional evidence of discrimination. While "pretext-plus," like the "slap in the face" rule, was rejected by the Supreme Court, 92 the Timmerman analysis suggests the continuing tendency of courts to require more 91 the courts continue to develop rules that find most comparator proof insufficient to create a jury question. 94 They do this largely by finding comparators to be different along any of a number of axes. 95 Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the courts seem to require the comparator to be the almost-twin of the plaintiff before the comparison is sufficiently probative. For example, (again focusing on the discriminatory discipline setting) the Fifth Circuit recently summarized its doctrine as requiring a plaintiff challenging her discipline for misconduct to show that her infraction was "nearly identical" to that of members of a different group who were treated more leniently.
96
This has been criticized as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach to racial discrimination in the context of peremptory challenges to jurors. Perhaps the most striking aspect of many of these cases is the courts' willingness to continue to compartmentalize various aspects of plaintiff's proof to find that none is sufficient. This is directly contrary to the holistic approach to evaluating evidence of discrimination that the Court required in 94. It is possible that this rule-orientation is a remnant of the days when jury trials were not available in Title VII cases. As originally enacted, Title VII relief, including backpay recovery, was viewed as equitable. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974) (noting, without approving, that "the courts of appeals have held that jury trial is not required in an action for reinstatement and backpay" under Title VII). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 instituted both compensatory and punitive damages, and the concomitant right to backpay. See 2 SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 44, at § 13.02.
95.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; see also Lidge, supra note 8, at 863-64 ("There are three main distinctions courts draw in deciding that the plaintiff and a comparator are not similarly situated: (1) the fact that the plaintiff and comparator had different supervisors; (2) the fact that the two employees had different responsibilities or job titles; and (3) the fact that they were punished for different conduct.").
96. See Perez v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 395 F.3d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 2004) ("In instructing, without more, that the employees' underlying misconduct must be comparably serious, the district court erroneously suggested that comparably serious misconduct was by itself enough to make employees similarly situated. A correctly worded instruction would have made clear that the jury must find the employees' circumstances to have been nearly identical in order to find them similarly situated."); Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Edwards v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 145 F. App'x 946 (5th Cir. 2005). In Edwards, the plaintiff could not show that the comparator was given preferential treatment in "nearly identical circumstances" because although both were charged with "job abandonment" for leaving during an overtime shift, the comparator "was not also cited for poor job performance, as Edwards was. Moreover, Lowe did not act in an insubordinate manner by directly rebuking authority as he left his shift. In finding individuals not similarly situated for purposes of disparate discipline, whether or not requiring near-identity, the lower courts have developed a number of other rules whose main common theme seems to be to prevent comparisons from having much power. Because they are framed as rules of law, not merely aids to inference, they effectively preclude suits pitched mainly on comparators. Perhaps the most wellestablished of such rules is that a comparator must have the same supervisor who disciplined the plaintiff, 100 a rule that is predicated on the notion products of a set of cookie cutters."). In Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006), that court concluded that the Miller-El reasoning "applies with equal force to the employmentdiscrimination context." Id. at 710 (citing Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 247 n.6). In its most recent decision dealing with racially premised peremptory challenges, the Court also took a relaxed approach to comparators. Although it found a number of bases to hold that the verdict was compromised by the prosecutor's use of challenges, one factor was a comparison between white jurors who were not excused and a black juror who was excused. laintiff is not obligated to show disparate treatment of an identically situated employee" since to establish a prima facie case "it is sufficient that the employee to whom plaintiff points be similarly situated in all material respects."); Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) ("To be 'similarly situated,' the individuals with whom Shumway attempts to compare herself must be similarly situated in all material respects."); see also Martin v. Toledo Cardiology Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2008) ("To satisfy the similarly-situated requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the comparable employee is similar 'in all of the relevant aspects.'" (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998))). The opinions are rarely clear about what makes a respect "material," which would seem the heart of the inquiry.
100.
See involved a reduction in force in which plaintiff wanted to call as witnesses five other older workers who claimed that they were also discriminated against in the downsizing because of their age. Defendant objected because none of the other potential witnesses worked under the same supervisor as the plaintiff. The trial court excluded the testimony, and the jury found for the defendant. The Tenth Circuit granted the plaintiff a new trial because it read the district court's exclusion of testimony by the five witnesses-to-be based on the erroneous view that admission of evidence of discrimination by other supervisors-so-called "me too" evidence-was categorically inadmissible. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit because it was unclear whether the district court's exclusion of the evidence was categorical or contextual. The proper approach was to ask the district court to clarify the basis of its ruling. The unanimous Court, however, did state that a rule of per se inadmissibility would be error, although it counterbalanced that by equally disapproving a rule of per se admissibility:
The question whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case. Applying Rule 403 to determine if evidence is prejudicial also requires a fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry. . . . Rules 401 and 403 do decision-maker, rather than the same supervisor."); Anderson v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561, 567 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that different managers is not critical when plaintiff was in the same chain of command as the comparator). 101.
The courts clearly are concerned only with whether the plaintiff's supervisor was motivated by discrimination. They reason that the fact that a putative comparator was treated better by another supervisor has little direct bearing on this question. By hypothesis, had the comparator worked for the same supervisor as plaintiff, he would have been treated the same.
This approach has been challenged as being inconsistent with how decision making occurs in the modern workplace. See Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 365-68 (2008) . It has also been questioned on the grounds that courts too readily assume that the plaintiff had a tougher supervisor when they should permit the finder of fact to choose between that alternative and the possibility that the plaintiff's supervisor is departing from employer norms for discriminatory reasons. and Rule 403 permits even relevant evidence to be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by considerations such as the dangers of prejudice or confusion. 105 Thus, Mendelsohn offers little guidance on the question of admissibility and basically commits the question to the district court, so long as the court exercises its discretion contextually.
106
Mendelsohn is obviously considerably different than the comparator question addressed in this Article. Not only did the issue involve admissibility rather than sufficiency of the evidence, but the issue was not whether an employee from a different class and who was better treated by another supervisor could be considered a proper comparator in a plaintiff's case; rather it was whether another supervisor's discriminatory action towards a member of plaintiff's class was admissible in the plaintiff's case. 107 Nevertheless, the unanimous opinion is supportive of the theme of this Article-that rule structures about comparators ought to give way to a more holistic consideration of whether a defendant's treatment of the putative comparator is a sufficient basis for a jury to find pretext.
Another rule that the lower courts had developed prior to Mendelsohn held that individuals with multiple infractions are simply not comparators for individuals with one infraction. 108 Relatedly, two persons are not simi-
103.
Id. at 1147. 104.
FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."). 105.
FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
106.
See the plaintiff claimed not only that he was innocent of the claimed assault of pushing his supervisor to the ground, but also that the employer imposed lesser discipline on comparators. The court rejected as comparators certain "nonminority employees" who had cursed their supervisors because this conduct "did not violate work rules of comparable seriousness" to the plaintiff's claimed assault.
112
More dramatically, the court in Kendrick refused to find a comparator in a white worker who had threatened a co-worker with assault and then arguably threatened his supervisor with physical violence. 113 Ironically, the notion that conduct has to be of comparable seriousness has led courts to find no comparator when arguably the employer punished the plaintiff for conduct that was far less blameworthy than the to report within 48 hours a speeding ticket and that he had received two speeding tickets within 12 months"); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that while three putative comparators "were similarly situated because they committed serious violations involving obscenity and/or physical abuse and were treated more favorably because they were not terminated," they were not, as was plaintiff, subject to a "last chance" agreement; further, none amassed a record of misconduct comparable to plaintiff's); 1) whether the plaintiff and those he maintains were similarly situated were subject to the same workplace standards and (2) whether the conduct for which the employer imposed discipline was of comparable seriousness. In other words, there should be an 'objectively identifiable basis for comparability.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Cherry v. AT&T, 47 F.3d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1995))).
110.
A variation on this occurs where, although the infraction may be identical, the disfavored employee admitted the violation and the favored employee did not, leaving the employer with some doubt as to guilt. See, e.g., Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000) (overturning a jury verdict for a white plaintiff, the court noted: "Whereas Abel has always freely admitted having taken $10.00 from the cash register, the other employee has never confessed to taking county funds for personal use; at worst, the would-be comparator has admitted to temporarily misplacing funds.") (footnote omitted). 111. 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).
112.
Id. at 1232; see also Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that two truck drivers who had similar unreported damage to their vehicles were not comparators when the black driver lied in his report and the white driver merely failed to report the damage).
113.
See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1233. The Kendrick court found several distinguishing features: First, the plaintiff was believed to have had physical contact with the person he threatened, while the comparator was not. Second, the union supported a lighter punishment for the comparator and vouched for him. Third, the employer took severe disciplinary action against the comparator, although less than against plaintiff. Fourth, the comparator incident occurred a year and a half after the decision to terminate Kendrick. See id. at 1233-34. 
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114
Another apparent rule precludes comparisons between individuals in different levels of jobs, ironically going both ways. The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held a supervisor not to be similarly situated to a subordinate both when the employer disciplined the supervisor more harshly because his position required him to act more responsibly, 115 and when the lower level worker was disciplined more harshly presumably because supervisors are entitled to more leeway. 116 Yet another rule distinguishes on the basis of seniority. In a disparate discipline case, for example, the Fifth Circuit found that older workers subject to lesser discipline than plaintiff were not comparators since they were closer to retirement and the employer might therefore have justifiably favored them. The second rejected comparator in Roy was a Sergeant Topping: Topping's misconduct, a traffic incident, is not sufficiently similar because he was not wearing his uniform, was in a private vehicle, and his misconduct related to directing subordinates to expedite various law enforcement actions that a private citizen would have been unable to accomplish. Most of Topping's misconduct involved making inappropriate demands on subordinates within the police department. Roy, on the other hand, exerted his authority over a foreigner visiting from Sweden. Moreover, Topping's misuse of authority had at least some relation to law enforcement purposes. Roy acknowledges that he had no law enforcement purpose when he pulled Eriksson over. Topping's other instance of misconduct, sexually harassing a coworker, is completely dissimilar. Topping is not similarly situated to Roy. Roy, 160 F. App'x at 876.
115.
See Mitchell v. City of Wichita, 140 F. App'x 767, 780 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Unless the other employees are subject to the same responsibilities, expectations, and discipline, the comparison to the disciplinary action taken against them does not support the inference that race is the reason for the disparity in treatment."). But see Lathem v. Dep't of Children & Youth Servs., 172 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding a jury verdict of sex discrimination when a female secretary was fired for a relationship with juveniles in the care of the agency while a male employee was merely transferred: "The relevant inquiry is not whether the employees hold the same job titles, but whether the employer subjected them to different employment policies.").
116.
See Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 753 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that although both the plaintiff and her comparator used the employer's phones to conduct outside business, "the comparison Jones makes between himself and Canino is not legally relevant. Canino was one of Jones's supervisors and therefore cannot be deemed similarly situated in a disciplinary matter such as this one."); see also Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (supervisor who committed same offense as trainee and was disciplined more lightly was not an appropriate comparator).
117.
See Ramon v. Cont'l Airlines Inc., 153 F. App'x 257, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that although all were guilty of the same misconduct, "Ramon was younger and not as close to being
222
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 60:2:191 have tended to find differences in experience sufficient to prevent a proposed comparator from being similarly situated to the plaintiff even if both meet the stated qualifications.
118
Finally, there is the question of time. The courts in disparate discipline cases have frequently refused to find a fact question of discrimination when the conduct of the plaintiff's proffered comparator was too distant in time from the plaintiff's own misconduct.
119
Outside the disparate discipline context, the courts have a less developed rule structure, but nevertheless frequently find individuals not to be comparators. Thus, a white who ran deficits for two months was not similarly situated to an African American who ran deficits for four months. 120 And a white with the same job duties, the same sales quota, and the same supervisor as the terminated African-American plaintiff was not similarly situated to him because plaintiff had a unique compensation arrangement and his co-worker's overall sales performance was superior.
121
The point is not, of course, that all these cases are necessarily incorrectly decided. It may well be that many of the putative comparators were not suitable-at least in the sense that the better treatment of the comparator, standing alone, would not be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to infer discrimination. But the circuit courts' searches for the perfect comparator-the almost-twin of the plaintiff-in both disparate discipline and eligible for retirement as were Arbaney and Lakey . . . . These differences between Ramon's situation and that of her comparators justified the differential treatment, and Ramon cannot demonstrate that she was 'similarly situated' to them.") (footnote omitted); see also Nelson v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2 F. App'x 425, 431 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that younger employee not similarly situated to older employee who committed similar infraction and was allowed to remain on job for a few extra months and obtain retirement eligibility).
118.
E.g., White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 243-44 (6th Cir. 2005) (putative comparator's greater amount and quality of experience meant that the two were not similarly situated); Bio v. Fed. Express Corp., 424 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2005) (although two employees held the same position and reported to the same supervisor, they were not "directly comparable" because of a considerable experience gap; the more experienced plaintiff was appropriately disciplined for conduct that the alleged comparator also engaged in while he was still learning how to perform his duties); Green v. New Mexico, 420 F.3d 1189, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (one worker was not similarly situated to plaintiff because he had greater seniority than plaintiff in the position in question and was not a probationary employee like plaintiff); Ramon, 153 F. App'x at 259-60 (fired plaintiff was not similarly situated to more senior worker involved in the same misconduct who was allowed to work until he was eligible for retirement precisely because of their different retirement-eligibility); Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff was not similarly situated to a predecessor employee who did not have the same job description; even if they were held to different performance standards, the other employee's greater seniority and the different conditions during which both worked precluded a comparison).
119.
E.g., Iuorno v. DuPont Pharms. Co., 129 F. App'x 637, 641 n.6 (2d Cir. 2005) (one of the reasons a proffered comparator was inadequate was that his misconduct occurred four years prior to plaintiff's); Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 76 (1st Cir. 2004) (plaintiff and "her putative congeners were not applying for the same openings at the same times; the speedier promotions occurred between eight and twenty-one months after the appellant's promotion to PSM") (emphasis omitted).
120.
See 
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"normal" individual disparate treatment cases establish this Article's underlying theme: favoring a sufficiently similar person is an adequate basis for inferring discrimination. The courts recognize this principle, but apply it far too grudgingly. The real question is when the putative comparator is similar enough to justify the inference, and it is here that the circuits seem hopelessly lost. It may be that Mendelsohn will lead to a less rule-oriented approach to comparators-requiring a more holistic approach not merely to the admission of evidence but also to the assessment of a plaintiff's case. But the troubling aspect of the networks of rules developed by the circuits on comparators prior to Mendelsohn is not their complexity, but the lack of any coherent rationale. A more contextual approach alone is not likely to solve that problem. To the extent a rationale is present, it can be drawn from the initial quotation in Timmerman: "apparently irrational differences" are explained by differences in supervisors, in timing, in individual circumstances, relative culpability, value to the company, or, failing all else, "the inevitability that human relationships cannot be structured with mathematical precision."
122
All of which may be true, but who decides that question, and what metric is used? The answers seem to be all too frequently that the courts decide and that they do so using their own sense of how employers in America function-or dysfunction.
V. A BETTER ANSWER
The ultimate basis for the elaborate legal rules the courts have developed must be the belief that random fluctuations are more likely than discrimination in the American workplace, and thus any differences are more likely attributable to a host of rational and irrational factors than they are to an intent to discriminate.
123
This reality raises two questions. The first is the obvious-Are the courts invading the province of the jury in deciding whether a particular putative comparator is indicative of discrimination? Contrary to some critiques of the judicial role, 124 I conclude that the courts are within their power in making these decisions. Indeed, so long as courts stand as gatekeepers to the ultimate fact finder, they necessarily have to determine whether a reasonable jury could find the fact at issue from the available evidence. My argument, however, is that the decisions they are actually making are predicated on a wrong metric. Rather than looking solely to the judge's own worldviews and experiences, whose accuracy might be legitimately questioned, the appropriate metric should be the reasonableness of the discrepancy in treatment in terms of industry practices. This metric should guide judges in the first instance in deciding when cases involving comparators should go to the jury and should guide jurors in the final analysis in deciding whether the more favorable treatment of a comparator justifies the ultimate inference of discrimination.
A. Judges, Juries, and Legislative Facts
With respect to the appropriate roles of judge and jury, it is undeniable that a jury should often decide whether favoring a white comparator is indicative of discrimination or a kind of random fluctuation that might occur without race being involved. The court opinions we have canvassed effectively demonstrate that comparing two workers is highly contextual, with multiple factors other than race, sex, or age potentially causing any given discrepancy. That seems a reason to entrust the determination to juries as a matter of fact rather than judges as a matter of law. On the other hand, the notion of comparator necessarily suggests sufficient similarity to infer discrimination, and the courts' role is to ensure that comparators are similar enough to justify sending the case to the jury. Thus, the typical opinion explicitly or implicitly references the "reasonable jury" as unable to infer discrimination from a particular comparator.
125
Reaching such a conclusion, however, demands a metric-a baseline for how different a putative comparator can be from the plaintiff and still serve as a basis (by himself or with other evidence) to infer that the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination. In short, it requires some sense of the relative frequency of discrimination as compared with random differences in treatment of employees. Although the willingness of courts to issue and affirm summary judgment against plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits has often been criticized, 126 the problem is not the role of the courts per se, but the accuracy of the metric they use. The Phoenix from the Ash 225 explanation for the circuit courts' approaches to comparators, as well as much else in employment discrimination cases, is their apparent perception (some would say, ideology) that discrimination is so much less frequent than random fluctuations of human behavior that a jury would not be reasonable in inferring discrimination unless the plaintiff and her comparator are very close indeed. Thus, it is only by excluding the vast majority of random influences that one could even be allowed to conclude that discrimination was the more likely explanation for a decision than the influence of one of the remaining random factors. While such a conclusion is undeniably fact-based, it draws on the traditional power of the courts to find what has been called "legislative facts."
128
In contrast to adjudicative facts, which are the province of juries, legislative facts are found by the courts in law making by drawing on, for lack of a better word, common-sense notions of how the world works.
129
So long as the courts continue their gatekeeper role of deciding whether a reasonable jury could find discrimination from a particular state of facts, 130 requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. I have stated all these points shortly because they are matters of common notoriety, matters not so much for judicial notice as for the background knowledge of educated men who live in the world. A court may advise itself of them as it advises itself of the facts that we are a "religious people," that the country is more industrialized than in Jefferson's day, that children are the natural objects of fathers' bounty, that criminal sanctions are commonly thought to deter, that steel is a basic commodity in our economy, that the imputation of unchastity is harmful to a woman. Such judgments, made on such a basis, are in the foundations of all law, decisional as well as statutory; it would be the most unneutral of principles, improvised ad hoc, to require that a court faced with the present problem refuse to note a plain fact about the society of the United States-the fact that the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a position of walled-off inferiority-or the other equally plain fact that such treatment is hurtful to human beings. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426-27 (1960 The problem, in short, is not that the courts are making such judgments. So long as courts stand in a gatekeeper role, such judgments are unavoidable. Rather, it is the judgments that they are making, or more accurately, the basis upon which they are making those judgments. And, if we do not like the judgments judges are making, and we can't replace the judges, the solution would seem to be to change the basis upon which judgments are being made.
Judicial law making on comparators is predicated upon the notion that discrimination is relatively rare, relative to other factors. This is problematic to begin with, but even more troublesome is when courts seem to go further and conclude that discrimination is rare even relative to seemingly irrational factors. In addition, since the courts are applying this approach to all the cases before them, their color-blind baseline governs a huge variety of workplaces and across the spectrum of racial and sexual interactions. So viewed, the best that can be said for the courts' approach is that it is a bright-line rule that is likely to be misapplied in some indeterminate subset of cases. And, given the empirical research about the continued vitality of discrimination, at least of the cognitive bias variety, 132 the worst that can be said about this approach is that it is profoundly misguided as a general matter because the courts have an incorrect view of the relative probabilities of the respective phenomena.
133

B. Changing Judicial Perceptions
"Legislative fact finding" of the kind at issue here is reached by a kind of judicial notice, but not the very constrained variety applicable to notice of adjudicative facts. 134 The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of 131.
It is a commonplace premise of evidence law that the law is structured in terms of judicial perceptions of probability. See Woolhandler, supra note 129, at 120 (citing EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 968-69 (3d ed. 1984)).
132.
See supra note 84.
133.
This Article does not attempt to resolve the simmering question of whether intent to discriminate requires a conscious intent or whether "unconscious discrimination" is also illegal when it causes an adverse employment action. Those, like Professor Kreiger, who view cognitive bias as sufficient, rest their position on the causation language of the antidiscrimination statutes, see Krieger, supra note 84, at 1168, which simply require a harm to have been "because of" race, sex or other prohibited characteristic. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (declaring it unlawful, inter alia, to refuse or to discharge any individual "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Although some raise normative and practical problems with making cognitive bias discrimination illegal, see, e.g., Wax, Discrimination as Accident, supra note 84, at 1226-31, some of the same commentators recognize that the inferential method of proving discrimination necessarily masks whether the employer is acting from conscious or unconscious motives. E.g., Wax, The Discriminating Mind, supra note 84, at 1004-05. That is to say, the fact finder infers discrimination from evidence, including comparators, which may reflect conscious actions or more subtle discrimination.
134.
See FED. R. EVID. 201(a) ("This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.").
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Evidence explicitly acknowledged a wide range of judicial power in this regard: the court should be able to "find" legislative facts in the same way it finds domestic law, 135 which basically includes all written or published sources, whether or not referenced by the parties. Indeed, since judges can look to their own life experiences, they are not limited to written material. Although some have argued for more formal constraints on this process, 136 there has been no success along these lines.
While the courts' determination of legislative facts is not subject to formal substantive constraints, the parties may attempt to influence such findings by evidence and citations. The Advisory Committee explicitly references the right to introduce evidence even of legislative facts, and the famous Brandeis brief 137 and its successors 138 demonstrate that legislative facts are often proffered in ways that track the offering of domestic law: citations to various authorities rather than evidentiary proof. One commentator concludes that, " [W] hen lawyers perceive that a particular showing will affect the outcome in a case, they tend to make such a showing, which courts tend to receive." 139 Thus, judicial perceptions of the relative frequency of discrimination and other factors are susceptible to influence by the parties who can seek to prove legislative facts in a variety of ways. I have elsewhere suggested that one of the failures of the plaintiffs' bar has been in educating the judiciary about the dynamics of discrimination in America in the new century.
140
I repeat the prescription there, which is for the use of expert wit-
135.
The Advisory Committee's note states: "In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the propositions of either party or of both parties. He may consult the sources of pertinent data to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an independent search for persuasive data or rest con This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative facts. It renders inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisputability, any formal requirements of notice other than those already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any level. However, the engrained worldviews of the courts are unlikely to be changed across the run of cases, 142 even by the skilled deployment of such evidence. Scholars have explored a variety of cognitive biases that give little hope that such a view, confirmed by the similar perspectives of so many other federal judges, will alter easily. 143 Rather, a more focused kind of evidence is needed, a kind that comes closer to the usual adjudicative facts with which judges are so familiar. Put another way, plaintiffs' attorneys need to try to counter one judicial bias with another. Judges may believe that discrimination is rare, and they may, therefore, believe that random fluctuations are more likely in any given case to explain an anomaly. But that is in part because they are faced with little evidence going the other way and in part because they are functioning in their legislative fact-finding role. The solution is for plaintiffs to put into evidence information that such anomalies are rare and not tolerated in relevant professional communities. This would serve to directly confront the judicial worldviews. And it would do so in the context of a 141.
Id. at 950-51 ("[P]laintiffs must introduce evidence in disparate treatment cases about the prevalence of discrimination. Perhaps the most obvious use of such testimony is to remind or convince the jury that discrimination is still prevalent (at least given the particular employment context) and therefore, to convince jurors that discrimination in the case at hand is more likely than they might at first believe. More dramatically, the new cognitive bias scholarship suggests that plaintiffs must go much further to explain why discrimination is both prevalent and largely invisible. That is, they must deploy expert testimony to educate the jury about the continued operation of race animus, consciously held stereotypes, the more subtle operation results of racially slanted cognitive biases, and/or the effect of workplace dynamics and cultures in enabling these biases.").
142.
Not surprisingly, judges are all lawyers and tend to have been lawyers in large organizations (whether private law firms or government agencies), rarely doing much employment law work. When they did encounter such cases, it would typically have been as counsel for employers. [T] he Constitutional and statutory silence on qualifications has left a vacuum that has been filled by de facto requirements that implicate cognitive biases and their resulting gender schemas. In recent nominations, the public discourse has revolved around two de facto requirements in particular. The process now seems to require that the candidate be: (1) a 'brilliant' graduate of an elite law school and (2) a sitting judge on a United States Circuit Court of Appeals. Of course, neither of these requirements was envisioned by the Framers as essential to a seat on the Court.") (footnotes omitted 
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C. A "Practices of the Trade" Metric
This Article urges the use of a new metric for comparators requiring a different type of expertise. It seeks to prevent, or at least cut down on, judges applying their own perceptions of the relative frequency of discrimination vis-à-vis other factors-perceptions likely to have been shaped by the judges' own experiences with all the biases that entails. Instead of asking judges to look into their life experiences, we should ask them to look at the actual practices of other employers. In other words, while the circuits have tended to list differences between plaintiff and proffered comparators and then apodictically declare them too great to be sufficient to infer discrimination, the better view is to ask whether the differences are such that a reasonable employer is likely to look to them in making the decision in question.
While some courts have resisted requiring too perfect a comparison between workers, See, e.g., Lynn v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 160 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1998) ("To show that employees are similarly situated, a plaintiff need only establish that he or she was treated differently than other employees whose violations were of 'comparable seriousness.' To require that employees always have to engage in the exact same offense as a prerequisite for finding them similarly situated would result in a scenario where evidence of favorable treatment of an employee who has committed a different but more serious, perhaps even criminal offense, could never be relevant to prove discrimination. Common sense as well as our case law dictate[s] that we reject such an approach. We think that Mohr's sleeping on the job was at least comparable to, if not much more serious than, the misconduct alleged against Lynn. Under the circumstances, we find that Lynn and Mohr were similarly situated.") (citation omitted); see also Jackson v. FedEx Corporate Servs., Inc., 518 F.3d 388, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2008) ("The purpose of Title VII and Section 1981 are not served by an overly narrow application of the similarly situated standard. . . . The number of employees with whom Jackson could be compared for purposes of establishing a comparable is relatively small. Jackson held a unique position within the workgroup, as he was the only system administrator. The district court's narrow definition of similarly situated effectively removed Jackson from the protective reach of the antidiscrimination laws. The district court's finding that Jackson had no comparables from the six other employees in the PowerPad project deprived Jackson of any remedy to which he may be entitled under the law.") (citation omitted and Judge Posner has been particularly graphic in stating that Title VII disparate treatment bars only discrimination on the prohibited grounds-not "whether the employer was mistaken, cruel, unethical, out of his head, or downright irrational." 156 But the fact that there is no duty to be reasonable does not mean that being unreasonable is not probative of discriminationwhich is, after all, a kind of unreasonable conduct-at least in terms of current social norms. 157 Indeed, while irrationality is not a per se violation of the antidiscrimination laws, the continued judicial reiteration of the point obscures a critical qualification-the irrationality or idiosyncrasy of the reason for acting is a basis for inferring discrimination if, as seems plausible, employers tend to act "reasonably" for a host of reasons, including market pressures.
The notion that employers can be expected to act reasonably is supported both by the Supreme Court and theoretic literature. 1631-39 (1991) ; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 84, at 59-78. Ironically enough, it is precisely in those situations where judges understand the rationality of discrimination that they are most likely to find it. E.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 (9th Cir. 1994) ("There was also evidence that another white male professor had stated that, given Japanese cultural prejudices, the PALS director should be male.") (footnote omitted). 158.
438 U.S. 567 (1978).
159.
Id. at 577 (citation omitted). Following Furnco, I use "irrational" to include all factors that do not seem to conduce to efficient operation of a particular firm. Unlike Furnco, however, I would try to This perception obviously cannot be limited to the prima facie case. The academic literature as well argues that irrationality, such as discrimination, will tend to result in the firm in question losing out in the market. 160 This argument is frequently deployed to argue that discrimination is rare and disappearing, but it seems equally or more apt to inform courts' judgments that irrationality is relatively rare in the workplace, thus allowing an inference of discrimination when the employer in question departs too much from current business norms.
Not every departure from such norms is irrational or will be punished by the market. At any given time, an employer might be a trendsetter for a new approach to workplace practices that might be more efficient and rewarded by the market. But this is highly unlikely in most of the settings with which we are concerned and, in addition, such situations are usually those in which the employer does not have a clear policy in play. Rather, the cases in question are typically ones where the defendant has acted in ways that are at least in tension with its own practices. If, in addition, the employer's conduct is inconsistent with the norms established by a reasonable employer, the inference of discrimination ought to be permissible. And, in any event, the employer remains free to explain as nondiscriminatory any departure from normal standards. 161 To be clear about the proposal, I am not suggesting that discrimination can be inferred merely by comparing Employer A's practices with Employer B's practices, or even with the practices of employers in A's industry. The notion that employers have a right to create their own norms and cultures, so long as they are not discriminatory, cuts too strongly against that. Rather, I am arguing only that, should an employee of A, say A1, argue that she has been treated worse than a comparator co-worker of a different race or the opposite sex, say A2, the courts should largely abandon their current structure of rules as to what constitutes a comparator and ask simply whether a reasonable employer would treat the cases the same or differently. If there is evidence from which the trier of fact could find that a reasonable employer would not do so, then the case should normally go to the jury. An inference of discrimination could be aided by other evidence, and I use the word "normally" to make clear that it is possible, even in such a situation, that other evidence might permit a court to still hold that no inference of discrimination is appropriate. put more content into the term by shifting focus from a means/ends analysis to a trade usage perspective, thus substituting "reasonableness" for "rationality." 160.
See Strauss, supra note 157, at 1631-39. See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Markets and Discrimination, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689 (2007) (exploring the various economic theories concerning discrimination). 161.
Court decisions that require a comparator to be similar in "all material respects," may have been expressing some such notion, however obliquely, since they implicitly rely on some notion of what makes a similarity or difference "material." This proposal, of course, turns on what is meant by a "reasonable" employer. I want to be clear that I am not proposing a hypothetical rational employer but rather using an objective standard of what real employers actually do. The courts have been busy inventing the hypothetical rational employer as a matter of law in deciding comparator cases, and they clearly believe that their construct makes many inconsistent, questionable, even irrational decisions. Focusing on real employer practices at least allows the possibility of a reality-corrective.
Admittedly, this approach is subject to the criticism that it reifies the status quo. A group that I label the new structuralists 162 is likely to be especially dissatisfied by my recommendation. However, rather than suggesting approval, it leaves current practices largely where it finds them. Further, there is at least the possibility of a ratcheting up on "best practices" as more employers adopt the approaches urged by the new structuralists. Finally, it seems more likely to be well received by the courts than more radical approaches since it leaves ample room for the bedrock judicial notion that employers ought to have the maximum freedom of action so long as they do not discriminate. Employers would be constrained only by the norms established by other employers; even then, they would be constrained only to the extent that they did not depart from such norms in relatively uniform ways; and even then, such departures, when they disadvantaged women and minorities, would at most allow the inference of discrimination, not require it.
The notion of reasonableness in terms of other market players is scarcely foreign to the law. It is a mainstay of the law of negligence, applicable not only in professional malpractice situations 163 but also where a Alabama Law Review [Vol. 60:2:191 trade establishes a standard of care.
164
Reasonableness assessed in terms of the relevant trade also plays a critical role in the law of contracts, most notably in the notion of trade usage. The legal realist position, in the form of Karl Llewellyn's approach to the Uniform Commercial Code, was precisely an effort to replace judicial views of how the commercial world worked with proof of actual commercial practices. 165 While parties remain free to reach any arrangement they wish, those who operate within a particular trade are held to trade usages if they do not clearly enough contract out from under them. Usage of the trade originated in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 166 for the sale of goods, 167 and was later generalized to all contracts by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 168 merely contends that violating such norms is probative of discrimination when the victim is a minority group member or a woman. 164.
While the general "reasonable person" standard, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965), does not focus on a particular community, cases in the trade or professional context look to professional norms. Id. § 299A ("Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities."). In both the tort and contract examples, the judge/jury roles are in line with the approach suggested by this Article. 169 Admittedly, neither the tort nor the contract example is perfectly attuned to the discrimination context, but both are suggestive. Both look to norms of the profession or business to set a baseline legal standard, and both allow for greater or lesser opt-out rights. 170 The use of the "reasonable employer" standard as a basis for inferring discrimination by an unreasonable employer is less restrictive than these standards because the employer is not formally bound to the standard but, at most, is required to explain its departure in nonracial (nongender) ways that will make sense to the finder of fact.
Nor is this approach foreign to discrimination law. When the Supreme Court rejected disparate impact or present-consequences-of-pastdiscrimination attacks on seniority systems, 171 such systems could be attacked only by showing that they were the result of intentional discrimination. In the course of that analysis, whether the system was "in accord with the industry practice" was an important consideration. 172 Applying such an approach requires first identifying the relevant "reasonable employer." While some practices may be reasonable (or unreasonable) for literally any employer, both the malpractice and trade usage
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The bottom line is that an expert may be able to testify that a putative comparator who was treated more favorably than plaintiff would not have been so treated by a reasonable employer, a kind of "standard of care" in the employment setting. That would be a basis for inferring discrimination if the plaintiff is of a different race (or sex) than the comparator. 180 Standing alone in light of such proof, such a comparator may be sufficient to permit, although not require, an inference of discrimination as the explanation for the difference in treatment. Of course, the employer will be able to respond with its own expert to the effect that discrepancies such as the one identified are common in the industry or trade, but the testimony of the plaintiff's expert should be sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Of course, such evidence will rarely stand alone. As Mendelsohn makes clear, the admissibility of evidence depends on its context, and the grant of summary judgment or the ultimate finding with respect to discrimination will also depend not merely on one comparator plus expert witness but rather on what other evidence both sides are able to adduce. For example, there may be additional comparators. Needless to say, the plaintiff would like to multiply comparators in order to reinforce the inference that the prohibited consideration, not some random factor, explained the difference in treatment. Conversely, the defendant would like to adduce comparators who rebut such an inference. These can be either members of the plaintiff's class who are treated better than their cross-racial comparators or members of the supposedly favored class who were treated worse than the comparator that the plaintiff adduced. For example, in a sex discrimination case, the plaintiff (Female1) might choose as a comparator Male1, who is paid more than she. The existence of Male2, Male3, and Male4-also paid more than she-would reinforce the inference of sex discrimination. On the other hand, should the defendant put into evidence Female2, who is paid as much as Male1, the inference of discrimination is less likely. 181 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 60:2:191 This evidence can sometimes be statistical, as when one party shows that a group as a whole either is benefited or burdened by the practice at issue, 182 but the point here is not "statistical significance" but rather that the inference of discrimination drawn from the preferred treatment of Male1 vs. Female1 is weakened or negated by proof of Male2 being treated less favorably than Male1, or Female2 being treated more favorably than she. 183 
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that underlying the current artificial proof structures for discrimination cases is a much simpler and more direct way to approach such proof. In the majority of cases, a plaintiff should identify a comparator who is sufficiently similar that the inference of discrimination may be drawn by a jury merely from the existence of such a person. While comparator proof can be fit into the traditional McDonnell Douglas proof structure, analysis would be facilitated if it were recognized as an alternative method of proof, a method which is more consistent with the Court's more holistic approach to proving discrimination in cases such as Desert Palace and Mendelsohn.
As indicated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ash to reject the Eleventh Circuit's "slap in the face" rule, making comparator proof not support an inference of improper animus when other minorities are accorded the same treatment as the non-minority employees.").
182.
See, e.g., Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 153 F. App'x 637, 645 (11th Cir. 2005) ("The evidence shows, however, that more Hispanic workers were affected by the cuts in overtime than American workers. Accordingly, Amos and Saunders cannot show similarly situated employees outside their protected class who were being treated differently from them."). 183.
In English v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002 (10th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff argued that proof that females were treated similarly to the male plaintiff, even if one female had been treated more leniently, dispelled the inference of discrimination, stating:
A plaintiff "can not pick and choose a person [he] perceives is a valid comparator who was allegedly treated more favorably, and completely ignore a significant group of comparators who were treated equally or less favorably than [he] ." Rather, if the record establishes that a number of non-protected employees have found themselves in similar circumstances, the plaintiff must show that the employer had established a pattern of granting more favorable treatment to protected employees for the relevant infraction. Id. at 1012 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 646-47 (3rd Cir. 1998)). See also Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 2006) (" [Requiring] closer and closer comparability between the plaintiff and the members of the comparison group . . . is a natural response to cherry-picking by plaintiffs . . . . If a plaintiff can make a prima facie case by finding just one or two male or nonminority workers who were treated worse than she, she should have to show that they really are comparable to her in every respect. But if as we believe cherry-picking is improper, the plaintiff should have to show only that the members of the comparison group are sufficiently comparable to her to suggest that she was singled out for worse treatment. Otherwise plaintiffs will be in a box: if they pick just members of the comparison group who are comparable in every respect, they will be accused of cherry-picking; but if they look for a representative sample, they will unavoidably include some who were not comparable in every respect, but merely broadly comparable.") (citations omitted). 
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The Phoenix from the Ash 239 more central to proof of discrimination is not a panacea because the circuits tend to require comparators to be the "almost twin" of a plaintiff before an inference of discrimination can be drawn from the disparity of treatment. Mendelsohn opens the way for a less rule-bound approach to comparator proof, but real change requires the courts to be more receptive to such proof, and this can be achieved only by substituting a more objective standard for current judicial worldviews about when an individual is sufficiently similar to the plaintiff to allow the jury to infer discrimination from the difference in treatment. Plaintiffs, therefore, should adduce-and courts should admit-expert testimony about whether other employers would treat the proffered comparators comparably. If the testimony is that employers generally adhere to a different standard of care, that evidence should normally suffice to send the case to the jury.
